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Abstract
We introduce a new mean field kinetic model for systems of rational agents
interacting in a game theoretical framework. This model is inspired from non-
cooperative anonymous games with a continuum of players and Mean-Field Games.
The large time behavior of the system is given by a macroscopic closure with a Nash
equilibrium serving as the local thermodynamic equilibrium. An application of the
presented theory to a social model (herding behavior) is discussed.
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1 Introduction
The paper aims at providing a framework for a non-cooperative non-atomic anonymous
game with a continuum of players [3, 23, 27, 29] also known as a Mean-Field Game [7, 20]
which exhibit strong scale separation. More precisely, we are interested in such games
where agents evolve their strategies according to the best-reply scheme on a much faster
time-scale than their social configuration variables. We target the derivation of a system
of equations which describes the slow evolution of the social configuration variables as a
consequence of the very fast evolution of the agents variables through a suitable averaging,
or ‘coarse-graining’ procedure. Indeed, the fast evolution of the strategy variables drives
the agents towards a local Nash equilibrium, where locality is both in social configuration
and time. The slow evolution equation depends on parameters that are computed from
these local Nash equilibria.
Therefore, this work provides a rigorous coarse-graining procedure to derive the large
time dynamic of the social configuration of the agents, in the spirit of a macroscopic model
in continuum mechanics. We believe that this framework provides a new viewpoint which,
by connecting kinetic theory to game theory, may be useful to address complex dynamical
problems in economics and social sciences. In this paper, we focus on the definition of a
framework and defer its detailed application to specific examples (such as the evolution
of wealth distribution in economic neighborhoods) to future work except for an example
of herding behavior that will be treated at the end.
We consider a dynamic model for an ensemble of rational agents or players in the
game-theoretical sense. Each agent is endowed with two variables: a type variable X
which describes the state of the agent such as its position in some social configuration
spece, such as its economic neighbourhood, its geographical position, etc., and a decision
(or control or action or strategy) variable Y which describes the strategies the agent can
play with during the game. The social configuration variable X and strategy variable Y
belong to the two spaces X and Y respectively. In this paper, for simplicity, we make
X = Rn while Y is a compact connected oriented Riemannian manifold imbedded in Rp.
This last assumption is inessential (Y = Rp could be used instead) but is made to avoid
tedious considerations about the integrability of the functions at infinity in y. We also
have in mind a herding example (section 5) where this framework is natural.
Each agents tries to minimize a cost function (or equivalently maximize a utility
function) in the presence of the other players in the framework of a non-cooperative,
anonymous game [15, 27]. The cost function depends on the social configuration and
decision variables of the agent itself and of all the other agents. By contrast to equilibrium
theory, we assume that the agents are not choosing the Nash equilibrium instantaneously
[25] (also known as Cournot-Nash equilibria), but rather each agent works towards this
goal by the so-called ‘best-reply strategy’, minimizing its cost while considering that the
other agents will not change theirs. This results in a descent in the direction of the
gradient of the cost function. In addition, this action is overlayed by some statistical
noise, giving rise to Brownian fluctuations. This setup gives rise to a system of stochastic
differential equations.
To put this abstract framework into a more concrete setting, we give the following
example. Let us consider that an agent works in a team and that her wage depends on
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her skill X, her investment (into training for instance) Y and the skill and investment of
the whole team. So, in this example, X ∈ X = Rn is the vector of possible skills and
Y ∈ Y = Rp is the vector of possible investments like e.g. job training. The agent wants
to maximise her wage. In order to do so, she chooses her action by considering that the
rest of the workers will not change theirs. She thus chooses to invest in the direction
which maximizes the increase of her wage. This leads to the evolution of Y according to
the best-reply strategy. Now, the evolution of the agent’s skill X depends on her current
skill and her investment. It is not unrealistic to say that her ability X evolves due to
these two factors [28] and that this evolution is slow compared to the rate of investment,
i.e. the evolution of Y .
We are interested in systems of a large number of agents where a continuum description
can be adopted, in the way of non-cooperative non-atomic anonymous games with a
continuum of players [3, 23, 27, 29] also known as Mean-Field Games [7, 20]. Indeed, in
the situation of anonymous games with a large number of players, the construction of a
mean field that serves as a mediator for describing inter-particle interactions constitutes
an excellent approximation. In this kind of models, one describes the contribution of each
particle to the creation of a mean field, and the effect of the mean field on each particle,
by conceiving each particle as infinitesimal, i.e. by carrying out a kind of limit process on
the number N of particles for N →∞. We refer the reader to [4] for a nice introduction
to game theory and Mean-Field Games. In the present paper we consider such mean field
models, i.e. we consider a continuum of players which, under the usual molecular chaos
assumptions, can be described by an effective equation for the probability distribution of
single agents in the phase space (x, y) consisting of the type and action variables.
In this large number of agents limit, a kinetic model for the time evolution of this
probability distribution f(x, y, t) can be written as follows.
∂tf(x, y, t) +∇x · [fV (x, y)]−∇y · [f∇yΦf (x, y, t)] = d∆yf . (1.1)
The vector valued function V (x, y) is given by the basic dynamics of the system, describing
how the state x evolves for a given control variable y. The forcing term∇y ·[f∇yΦf (x, y, t)]
in equation (1.1) describes the agent trying to minimize the cost functional Φf by marching
in the steepest descent direction −∇yΦf (In the mean field model considered in this paper
Φf will exhibit a functional dependence on the density f). The Laplacian on the right
hand side of equation (1.1) is a consequence of the Brownian noise in the system, with the
diffusion coefficient d corresponding to the variance 2d. Again, by contrast to the usual
Mean-Field Game models for agent systems [7, 20] where the optimum control is realized
instantaneously (leading to the solution of a Hamilton - Jacobi - Bellman equation), our
agents march an infinitesimal step towards the optimum at each time step by taking the
steepest descent of the cost functional.
The substance of this paper is to relate the kinetic description given by equation (1.1)
to the well-established game theoretical framework. We show that, in the homogeneous
case, when the density f is independent of the state x, steady state solutions of equation
(1.1) correspond to Nash equilibria. Therefore the model considered here, which relies on
the best-reply strategy, results in a scheme consisting of agents choosing their strategy
variables in the direction of steepest descent towards this Nash equilibrium. In the case of
potential games [24, 26], when the cost functional Φf can be expressed as the functional
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derivative of a potential functional, we show that the kinetic equation can be expressed as
the gradient flow of a free energy. Nash equilibria are the critical points of this free energy.
Stable Nash equilibria are those which correspond to a global minimum of the free energy,
the other minima corresponding to metastable ones. For special cases, we can prove that
the dynamic solution of the kinetic equation converges to these stable or metastable Nash
equilibrium solutions (see section 5). We note that potential games have originated from
congestion games aimed at describing congested traffic situations [26] and that we will
recover familiar models of traffic flow below (see Eq. 1.2 and comments below). Recently,
an approach similar to that developed here has been applied to pedestrian traffic [1, 2].
The main goal of the paper is to investigate the inhomogeneous case, when the proba-
bility density f depends on the both the state (or type) x and control variable y. We aim
to derive macroscopic dynamic equations in the state variable x only, which constitute
good approximations to the solution of equation (1.1) at large scales. Indeed, we look at
the system over time scales which are large compared to the typical time needed by the
players to act on their control variables. Simultaneously, we suppose that the interactions
between the players are localized in the state space x. This corresponds to a situation of
so-called bounded information where the agents only take into account agents which are
close to themselves in state space x to make their decision, ignoring agents in the far field.
In the macroscopic dynamics, we focus on scales in state space which are large compared
to this interaction scale. Over these large time and state space scales, the distribution of
agents in the control variable y instantaneously realizes the local Nash equilibrium. This
local Nash equilibrium describes the statistics of agents in control variable y and depends
on parameters which may vary over the large scale state variable x and time t. Such
parameters may be e.g. the local number density ρ(x, t) of agents at given state x and
time t, or the mean or standard deviation of the local Nash equilibrium distribution.
The resulting macroscopic equation represents, in the language of kinetic theory, the
macroscopic closure of the kinetic equation, using the Nash equilibrium distribution as the
Local Thermodynamic Equilibrium. For instance, the large time evolution of the density
ρ(x, t) is of the form
∂tρ(x, t) +∇x · (uρ) = 0 , (1.2)
where ρ is related to the probability density f by ρ(x, t) =
∫
f(x, y, t) dy. The macroscopic
velocity u(x, t) is given by the expectation of the local velocity V (x, y) over the Nash
equilibrium distribution. In the simplest possible case the macroscopic velocity u can
be expressed in terms of the macroscopic density ρ as u = uρ, giving a closed (usually)
hyperbolic conservation law such as in the Lighthill-Whitham-Richards model of traffic
[22]. However, in many applications the structure of the macroscopic velocity u is more
complicated, and additional constitutive equations are needed to obtain a closed system
from equation (1.2). In such an occurrence a case by case study is necessary. We will give
such an example in section 5.
This paper is organized as follows:
- In Section 2 we define the basic model, consisting of a system of stochastic differential
equations, and state under what assumptions the solution can be expressed in terms
of a mean field density for one effective agent.
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- Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of equilibria. For this purpose it is sufficient to
consider the homogeneous case where the density function f in (1.1) does not depend
on the state variable x. In this case the equilibrium solution is given as the solution
of a fixed point problem and we show that this equilibrium solution is actually a
Nash equilibrium in the game theoretical sense. In the case of potential games, we
provide a variational structure and Lypounov functional to equation (1.1).
- Section 4 is concerned with the inhomogeneous case. We consider the macroscopic
limit in the regime when the control variable y is adjusted on a much faster time
scale than that of the evolution of the state variable x and when the interactions
are nearly local in state space. In the limit, this leads to the macroscopic model
(1.2) where the macroscopic velocity u has to be computed from the local Nash
equilibrium.
- In Section 5, we apply the framework developed so far to a model of social herding
behavior, where V is an actual velocity in physical space, and the goal of each
individual is to adjust to the mean velocity of the ensemble. Here, equilibrium
distributions are given by the Von-Mises-Fischer distribution. This serves as an
example of a potential game. However, the macroscopic limit equation (1.2) is
not well defined unless some additional constitutive relations are used to determine
the macroscopic velocity u. An other example pertaining to the evolution of the
distribution of wealth in economic neighborhood can be found in [11]. There are
many models of social interactions and group formation based on a game theoretical
approach (see e.g. [19]).
- In section 6, a conclusion is given and perspectives are drawn.
2 A mean-field model of social dynamics
We consider N rational agents (or players) moving continuously in a space of social
configurations X . Each agent labeled j, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} has social configuration Xj(t) ∈
X , depending on time t ∈ R+. It controls its state by an action (or decision) variable Yj(t)
belonging to a space of control variables Y . For simplicity, we suppose that X = Rn and Y
is a compact, orientable, connected manifold imbedded in Rp with or without boundary
and endowed with the Riemannian structure induced by Rp. Given (Xj(t), Yj(t)), the
j-th agent moves in configuration space with velocity Vj(t) = V (Xj(t), Yj(t)), where
V = V (X, Y ) is a given function of the configuration and decision variables, and will
be referred to as the social velocity of agents at social configuration X having strategy
Y . To act on their decision variables, the agents impose a given force FNj which will
be a function of his own and the other agents’ configuration and decision variables. In
addition to this force, each agent’s decision variables are subject to Brownian noises which
model uncertainties in the decision process as well as of the influence of the environment.
Brownian noises for different agents are independent. In order to constrain the dynamics
of the decision variables to the manifold Y , the resulting combination of the force and
Brownian noise is projected onto the tangent plane TYj(t) to Y at this point. The particle
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dynamics is given by the following Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE):
X˙j = V (Xj(t), Yj(t)), dYj = PTYj(t) ◦ (F
N
j +
√
2d dW jt ), (2.1)
where the dot indicates the time derivative, PTYj(t) is the orthogonal projection onto the
tangent plane to Yj(t), the symbol ◦ refers to the Stratonowich interpretation of the
SDE, dW jt for j ∈ {1, . . . , N} denote N independent Brownian motions in Rp and d is
the diffusion coefficient. Finally FNj denotes the force acting on the j-th agent which is
described below. In the case where Y is a manifold with boundary, suitable boundary
conditions must be given. Such boundary conditions will be specified later on in the
kinetic framework (see Eq. (2.8)). That (2.1) provides a well-defined SDE on X × Y
follows from the theory descibed e.g. in [16].
We denote by ~X(t) = (X1, . . . , XN ), ~Y (t) = (Y1, . . . , YN) and Yˆj = (Y1, . . . , Yj−1,
Yj+1, . . . , YN) (in game theory, the notation Y−j is usually preferred to Yˆj). We also write
~Y = (Yj, Yˆj) by abuse of notation. We assume the existence of a cost function Φ
N( ~X, ~Y , t)
which each agent tries to minimize by acting on its strategy variables, assuming that the
other agents do not change theirs. This means that each agent j relaxes its control variable
Yj towards an equilibrium Yj( ~X, Yˆj, t) such that
Y Nj ( ~X, Yˆj, t) = arg min
Yj∈Y
ΦN( ~X, Yj , Yˆj, t), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (2.2)
Since such a goal cannot be achieved instantaneously, it chooses the best-reply strategy,
i.e. it acts on itself such that
FNj ( ~X, ~Y , t) = −∇YjΦN( ~X, Yj, Yˆj , t), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (2.3)
We now assume that FNj is globally Lipschitz with respect to all its arguments, so that
the system (2.1) has global solutions.
The terminology used so far is borrowed from classical physics (see e.g. the term ‘force’
to describe the action of the agents). We refer to the ‘investment-skill’ example given in
the introduction for a description in more economical terms. Within this example, the
force would characterize the rate at which the agent would invest to improve her wage. A
more sophisticated way to optimize the action or control variables is to use a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (see e.g. the Mean-Field Game theory of Lasry & Lions [20]).
We can also easily generalize this setting to a fiber bundle but we will stay in the frame
of a trivial bundle (i.e. a cartesian product) for simplicity.
Now, we introduce the N -particle empirical distribution function
fN(x, y, t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXj(t)(x)⊗ δYj(t)(y),
and regard fN as a map from t ∈ R+ to fN(t) ∈ P(X ×Y), where P(X ×Y) denotes the
space of probability measures on X ×Y . We assume that in the mean-field limit N →∞
of the number of players going to infinity, there exists a one-particle distribution function
f = f(x, y, t), which maps t ∈ R+ to f(t) ∈ Pac(X × Y) where Pac(X × Y) is the space
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of probability measures on X × Y which are absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure on X ×Y (i.e. the measure on X ×Y induced by the Lebesgue measure
on Rn × Rp), such that
fN ⇀ f, (2.4)
in the weak star topology of bounded measures. We assume that a mean-field cost function
exists. More precisely, we assume that there exists a map Pac(X × Y) → C2(X × Y),
f 7→ Φf , such that, for all trajectories (Xj(t), Yj(t)) satisfying (2.4), we have
ΦN(Xj(t), Xˆj(t), Yj(t), Yˆj(t), t)→ Φf(t)(Xj(t), Yj(t)), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀t ≥ 0. (2.5)
This assumption means that the influence of the rest of the agent ensemble can be replaced
by a functional dependence on the distribution of the social configuration and decision
variables of a single anonymous agent. Therefore, two agents which have the same strategy
are indistinguishable, which is known as an anonymous game.
Thanks to this assumption, in the limit N →∞, the one-particle distribution function
f is a solution of the following Fokker-Planck equation [30]
∂tf +∇x · (V (x, y) f) +∇y · (Ff f) = d∆yf, (2.6)
where Ff = Ff (x, y, t) is given by
Ff (x, y, t) = −∇yΦf(t)(x, y). (2.7)
In (2.6), the symbol ∇y· denotes the divergence of tangent vector fields on Y , while ∆y
is the Laplace-Beltrami operator on Y . Below, we will also use ∇y for the tangential
gradient of functions defined on Y . We supplement this system with an initial condition
f(0) = f0. For short, we will write Φf(t) = Φf . In the case where Y is a manifold with
boundary, we set a zero flux condition on the boundary X × ∂Y , namely:
f∂nΦf + d∂nf = 0, on X × ∂Y , (2.8)
where ∂nf(x, y) denotes the normal derivative of f at (x, y) ∈ X × ∂Y .
3 The homogeneous configuration case: convergence
to Nash equilibria
3.1 General setting
In this section, we consider the case where the dynamics of the decision variables is
independent of the state variables and we restrict the system to the decision variables
only. In the kinetic-theory framework, this would refer to the spatially homogeneous case,
where the spatial dependence is omitted. Then, f becomes a mapping from t ∈ [0,∞[
to f(t) ∈ Pac(Y), where Pac(Y) is now the space of absolutely continuous probability
measures on Y . The cost function Φ becomes a mapping from f ∈ Pac(Y) to Φf ∈ C2(Y).
Eq. (2.6) is now written:
∂tf = Q(f), Q(f) = ∇y · (f ∇yΦf + d∇yf) , (3.1)
7
with initial condition given by f0. We note that we can write the collision operator Q(f)
as follows:
Q(f) = ∇y ·
(
f ∇y
(
Φf + d ln f
))
= ∇y ·
(
f ∇yµf
)
, (3.2)
with
µf (y) = Φf (y) + d ln f(y). (3.3)
In the case where Y has boundary, then the boundary condition (2.8) reduces to
f ∂nµf = 0, on ∂Y , (3.4)
where ∂nµf (y) is the normal derivative of µf at y ∈ ∂Y . For a given function Φ(y), we
introduce the Gibbs measure MΦ(y) by:
MΦ(y) =
1
ZΦ
exp
(− Φ(y)
d
)
, ZΦ =
∫
y∈Y
exp
(− Φ(y)
d
)
dy. (3.5)
The definition of ZΦ is such that MΦ is a probability density, i.e. it satisfies∫
y∈Y
MΦ(y) dy = 1. (3.6)
Now, we can write
Q(f) = d∇y ·
(
MΦf ∇y
( f
MΦf
))
. (3.7)
We have the
Lemma 3.1 (i) For any sufficiently smooth function f and g on Y, we have
∫
y∈Y
Q(f)
g
MΦf
dy = −d
∫
y∈Y
∇y
( f
MΦf
) · ∇y( g
MΦf
)
MΦf dy, (3.8)
(ii) We have
∫
y∈Y
Q(f)
f
MΦf
dy = −d
∫
y∈Y
∣∣∣∇y( f
MΦf
)∣∣∣2MΦf dy ≤ 0. (3.9)
Proof. (i) Multiplying (3.7) by g/MΦf , integrating over y and using Green’s formula on
Y , we get (3.8). In the application of Green’s formula, the boundary term is either absent
when Y has no boundary or vanishes due to the boundary condition (3.4) in the case
where Y has a boundary. Indeed, we notice that
f
MΦf
= ZΦf e
µf
d , Q(f) = dZΦf ∇y ·
(
MΦf ∇y e
µf
d
)
. (3.10)
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Therefore, the boundary term in Green’s formula is written
dZΦf
∫
y∈∂Y
MΦf (y) ∂n
(
e
µf (y)
d
)
(y)
g
MΦf
dS(y) = 0,
where dS(y) is the measure on ∂Y and where the integral is zero because
∂n
(
e
µf (y)
d
)
(y) =
1
d
e
µf (y)
d ∂nµf (y) = 0,
by virtue of (3.4).
(ii) We let g = f in (3.8) and get (3.9).
From Lemma 3.1, we deduce the following
Proposition 3.2 The distribution function f ∈ Pac(Y) is an equilibrium solution, i.e.
a solution of Q(f) = 0 if and only if f is of the form feq where feq is a solution of the
following fixed point problem:
feq(y) =
1
ZΦfeq
exp
(− Φfeq(y)
d
)
, ZΦfeq =
∫
y∈Y
exp
(− Φfeq(y)
d
)
dy. (3.11)
Proof. First, suppose that Q(f) = 0. Then,
∫
y∈Y
Q(f) f
MΦf
dy = 0. Therefore, thanks
to (3.9), f
MΦf
is a constant. Using the positivity of MΦf and its normalization condition
(3.6), we get f =MΦf . Consequently, for f to be an equilibrium, it has to satisfy the fixed
point problem (3.11). Conversely, if feq is a solution of the fixed point problem (3.11),
then
feq
MΦfeq
= 1 and Q(feq) = 0 follows.
We now show that equilibria (3.11) are Nash equilibria for the mean-field game (also
known as non-cooperative anonymous game with a continuum of players [7]) associated
to the cost function augmented by the contributed of the noise µf (y) (or ‘augmented cost
function’). We first define the concept of a Nash equilibrium for such a game [5, 6, 7].
Definition 3.3 A Nash equilibrium measure fNE ∈ P(Y) for the Mean-Field Game de-
fined by the cost function µf (y) is such that there exists a constant K and{
µfNE(y) = K ∀y ∈ Supp(fNE),
µfNE(y) ≥ K ∀y ∈ Y , (3.12)
where Supp(f) refers to the support of f , i.e. the closure of the set where f 6= 0.
We recall the following proposition [7]:
Proposition 3.4 Definition (3.12) is equivalent to the following statement:∫
y∈Y
µfNE(y) fNE(y) dy = inf
f∈Pac(Y)
∫
y∈Y
µfNE(y) f(y) dy. (3.13)
Eq. (3.13) is called the ‘mean-field’ equation.
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Now, we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5 Let f ∈ Pac(Y). Then the two following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is an equilibrium (3.11),
(ii) f is a Nash equilibrium (3.12).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let feq be an equilibrium (3.11). Since Y is compact and Φf is
continuous on Y for any f ∈ Pac(Y), then Φfeq is bounded. Therefore, its support is
the entire manifold Y and the second line of (3.12) reduces to the first line. We easily
compute that K = −d lnZΦfeq . Therefore, feq is a Nash equilibrium (3.12).
(ii)⇒ (i). Let fNE be a Nash equilibrium (3.12). We show that Supp(fNE) = Y . Indeed, by
contradiction, suppose Supp(fNE)  Y . There exists y ∈ Y such that fNE(y) = 0. Then,
because of the log inside (3.3) and the boundedness of ΦfNE , we have µfNE(y) = −∞ which
is a contradiction to the second line of (3.12). Therefore, by the first line of (3.12), µfNE
is identically constant over the entire space Y . From the expression of µfNE in (3.3), fNE
is proportional to exp(−ΦfNE/d), which means that it is an equilibrium (3.11).
The mean-field model (3.1), (3.2) can be recast as a transport equation as follows
∂tf +∇y · (v f) = 0, (3.14)
v = −∇yµf . (3.15)
It describes the bulk motion of agents which move in the direction of the steepest descent
towards the minimum of µf . When all agents have reached the minimum of µf , then µf is
a constant and describes a Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, in the proposed dynamics, the
agents are driven towards the Nash equilibrium by the best-reply strategy i.e. they choose
as their action to move in the descent direction of the gradient of the cost functional.
Remark 3.1 The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria i.e. solutions of the fixed
point problem (3.11) is an open problem in the fully general setting. However, in section
5, we provide an example where such equilibria exist. Depending on the conditions, they
may be unique or not. In the non-uniqueness case, this leads to the occurrence of phase
transitions. the final Nash equilibrium which is reached as t → ∞ depends on the initial
condition.
3.2 Variational structure and potential games [24]
In this section, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1 There exists a functional U(f) such that
Φf (y) =
δU(f)
δf
(y), ∀y ∈ Y ,
where δU(f)
δf
is the functional derivative of U defined by
∫
y∈Y
δU(f)
δf
(y)φ(y) dy = lim
s→0
1
s
(U(f + sφ)− U(f)), (3.16)
for any test function φ(y).
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We note that the existence of such a functional gives a very strong constraint on Φ
(if f were finite-dimensional, i.e. if Y were replaced by a finite set and eq. (3.1) by a
system of ordinary differential equations, that would mean that Φ is the gradient of the
scalar potential U). We will call U the potential energy. A game associated to such a cost
function Φ is called a potential game [24]. We now introduce the entropy functional:
S(f) = d
∫
y∈Y
f(y) ln f(y) dy, (3.17)
and the free energy
F(f) = U(f) + S(f). (3.18)
It is a simple matter to find that
δS(f)
δf
(y) = d ln f(y).
Therefore, we have
δF(f)
δf
(y) = Φf (y) + d ln f(y) = µf (y). (3.19)
In statistical physics, the first-order variation of the free energy of a system is called the
‘chemical potential’. Building on this analogy, we call the augmented cost function µf (y),
the chemical potential associated with the free energy F(f). Now, we can recast (3.1),
(3.2) as
∂tf = ∇y ·
(
(∇yµ)f
)
= ∇y ·
(
∇y
(δF(f)
δf
)
f
)
. (3.20)
But, for a function f(y, t), we have
d
dt
F(f(·, t)) =
∫
y∈Y
δF(f(·, t))
δf
(y)
∂f
∂t
(y, t) dy.
Inserting (3.20) into the above equation, and using Green’s formula, we have:
d
dt
F(f(·, t)) = −
∫
y∈Y
f(y, t)
∣∣∣∇y δF(f(·, t))
δf
(y)
∣∣∣2(y, t) dy := −D(f(·, t)) ≤ 0. (3.21)
Using (3.21), Eq. (3.20) can be viewed as a gradient flow in the Wasserstein metric and
can be discretized in time using the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto scheme [18].
Therefore, F is Liapounov functional for this dynamic and D is the free-energy dissi-
pation term. By fine analysis of D, it is possible in some cases to deduce decay rates from
this kind of estimate [14, 32]. Equilibria given by (3.11) are critical points of F subject
to the constraint
∫
f dy = 1 and the chemical potential µ is the Lagrange multiplier of
this constraint in this optimization problem. Each of these critical points corresponds
to a Nash equilibrium. However, these critical points are not necessarily global minimiz-
ers of the free energy. Among these equilibria, the ground states, which are the global
minimizers of F are the most stable ones. Other equilibria are either not stable or only
locally stable (or meta-stable). The co-existence of several stable equilibria may give rise
to phase transitions and hysteresis behavior if bifurcation parameters are involved and
varied.
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4 The inhomogeneous configuration case: Nash Equi-
librium macroscopic closure
Now, we return to the inhomogeneous configuration case (2.6), (2.7) where the positions
of the players in the social configuration space is considered. The goal of this section
is to investigate the ensemble motion of the players at large time scales, averaging out
over their individual decision variables. For this purpose, we have to assume a temporal
scale separation, where individual decisions are fast compared to the evolution of the
ensemble of players in configuration space. We also need to observe the system as a bulk,
averaging out the fine details of the individual players in configuration space. Therefore,
we will introduce a suitable coarse-graining procedure. We take advantage of the fact that
individuals act on their decision variables in such a way that the augmented cost function
µf is gradually reduced. Eventually, at large times, no agent can reduce µf any further by
acting on its own decision variables. Such a state is by definition a Nash equilibrium and is
given by (3.11). We use this equilibrium as a prescription for the internal decision variable
distribution of the agents. In this section, we provide the details of this coarse-graining
process, known as the hydrodynamic limit in kinetic theory.
In order to manage the various scales in a proper way, we first change the variables
to dimensionless ones. Let t0 be a time unit and let x0 = at0, where a is the typical
magnitude of V . We choose t0 in such a way that the magnitude of Φ is O(1) and
introduce the quantity d˜ = dt0 = O(1). The decision space Y is already dimensionless
and the variable y does not require any scaling. Introducing new variables x˜ = x/x0,
t˜ = t/t0, f˜(x˜, y, t˜) = x
n
0f(x, y, t), V˜ (x˜, y) = V (x, y)/a, Φ˜f˜ (x˜, y) = Φf (x, y), Eq. (2.6) is
written:
∂t˜f˜ +∇x˜ · (V˜ (x˜, y)f˜) +∇y · (F˜f˜ f˜) = d˜∆yf˜ , (4.1)
where F˜f˜ is given by
F˜f˜ (x˜, y, t˜) = −∇yΦ˜f˜ (x˜, y), (4.2)
We now introduce the macroscopic scale. Refering to the discussion of the beginning
of this section, we change the configuration space unit and the time unit to new ones x′0,
t′0 which are large compared to x0, t0. Specifically, we let ε ≪ 1 be a small parameter
and define x′0 = x0/ε, t
′
0 = t0/ε. Here, ε refers to the ”small” average change of the
configuration of the ensemble of agents on the ”fast” time-scale of the evolution of the
decision variables. In the kinetic framework, ε would be a measure of the particle mean-
free path in macroscopic units. By doing so, we change the space and time variables x˜ and
t˜ to macroscopic variables xˆ = εx˜, tˆ = εt˜ and define fˆ(xˆ, y, tˆ) = ε−nf˜(x˜, y, t˜). Inserting
this change of variables into (4.1), (4.2), we are led to the following perturbation problem
(dropping the hats and tildes for simplicity):
ε
(
∂tf
ε +∇x · (V (x, y)f ε)
)
+∇y · (F εfε f ε) = d∆yf ε, (4.3)
where Ffε is given by
F εf (x, y, t) = −∇yΦεf (x, y). (4.4)
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The following assumption is an assumption of spatial scale separation between the
decision and social configuration variables.
Assumption 4.1 For a distribution function f(x, y), f ∈ Pac(X × Y), we assume that
Φεf can be developed as follows:
Φεf (x, y) = Φρ(x), νx(x, y) +O(ε2), (4.5)
with
νx(y) =
1
ρ(x)
f(x, y), ρ(x) =
∫
y∈Y
f(x, y) dy, (4.6)
and Φρ,ν is a map [0,∞)× Pac(Y)→ C2(X × Y), (ρ, ν) 7→ Φρ, ν.
In short, νx is the conditional probability density of f conditioned on fixing the position
x ∈ X , and it belongs to Pac(Y). Eq. (4.5) states that, up to factors of order O(ε2), the
cost function is a functional of this conditional probability and of the density only, and
therefore, only depends on local quantities at social position x. The O(ε2) term collects
all non-local effects in social position space. These effects are supposed to be much smaller
than the local ones. This is an expression of the scale separation in social space: local
effects in social space are supposed to have a much bigger influence that non-local ones
on a given subject.
Indeed, Assumption 4.1 states that the fast dynamics which are driven by the leading
order of the cost function (4.5) and which only acts on the decision variable y, only
depends on the other agents located at the same social position x. The remainder O(ε2)
term, which collects all non-local effects acts even more slowly than the slow dynamics
(the order O(ε) in (4.1)) which affects the social position variable x. If the remainder
term were O(ε) only, the slow dynamics would exhibit a contribution coming from the
non-local term, which is neglected here. If the scale-separation assumption 4.1 is not
satisfied, the coarse-graining procedure cannot be implemented since the social variable
x evolves on the same scale as the decision variable y.
The macroscopic limit is about taking the limit ε → 0 in this set of equations. In
order to do so, we write (4.3), (4.4) as follows:
∂tf
ε +∇x · (V (x, y)f ε) = 1
ε
Q(f ε), (4.7)
with Q given by
Q(f) = ∇y ·
(∇yΦρ(x,t), νx,t f + d∇yf) , (4.8)
and where ρ(x, t), νx,t are related to f(t) by (4.6). Here, we have used (4.5) to replace
Φε by Φ in (4.7), (4.8) and dropped the remaining O(ε) terms. In the example section
below, we will show that this assumption is actually quite natural.
Here again, we emphasize that (x, t) now refers to slow variables. The left-hand side of
(4.7) describes how the distribution of agents as a function of the external variables (the
social configuration x) evolves. This evolution is driven by the the fast, local evolution
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of this distribution as a function of the individual decision variables y described by the
right-hand side. The parameter ε at the denominator highlights that fact that the internal
decision variables evolve on a faster time-scale than the external social configuration
variables. The fast evolution of the internal decision variables drives the system towards
an equilibrium, i.e., solution of Q(f) = 0. Such a solution is referred to in physics as
a Local Thermodynamical Equilibrium (LTE). Below, we use the results of the previous
section to show that, in this case, the LTE’s are given by Nash equilibria.
To highlight this fact, by factoring out ρ(x, t) from the expression of Q in (4.8), we
can recast it as follows:
Q(f) := ρ(x, t)Qρ(x,t)(νx,t), (4.9)
where, for any ρ ∈ R+, we define the operator Qρ acting on Pac(Y) as follows:
Qρ(ν) := ∇y · (∇yΦρ, ν ν + d∇yν) . (4.10)
The equation Q(f) = 0 can then be recast (supposing that ρ(x, t) 6= 0) into Qρ(x,t)(νx,t) =
0. But the operator Qρ freezes the slow variables (x, t) and acts only on the distribution
of agents in the decision variable y. Therefore, this equation is merely a homogeneous
configuration problem and we can apply Proposition 3.2 to solve it. This leads to the
following lemma whose proof is a direct application of Proposition 3.2 and is omitted.
Lemma 4.1 The LTE, i.e. the solutions of Q(f) = 0 are given by
f(x, y, t) = ρ(x, t) νeq, ρ(x,t)(y), (4.11)
where νeq, ρ(y) is a solution of Qρ(ν) = 0. Such solutions νeq, ρ(y) are given by the resolution
of the Nash equilibrium fixed point problem
νeq, ρ(y) =
1
ZΦρ, νeq,ρ
exp
(− Φρ, νeq,ρ(y)
d
)
, ZΦρ, νeq,ρ =
∫
y∈Y
exp
(− Φρ, νeq,ρ(y)
d
)
dy.(4.12)
Now, we can state the result for the coarse-graining limit ε→ 0 inside Eq. (4.7). We
have
Theorem 4.2 Under Assumption 4.1, suppose that the solution f ε to (4.7) converges
to a function f when ε → 0 smoothly, which means in particular that all derivatives of
f ε converge to the corresponding derivative of f . Then, formally f is given by an LTE
(4.11). The density ρ(x, t) satisfies the following conservation law:
∂tρ+∇x · (ρu) = 0, (4.13)
with
u = u[νeq, ρ(x,t)](x), (4.14)
being the mean social velocity of νeq, ρ(x,t) and u[ν](x) is given by
u[ν](x) =
∫
y∈Y
V (x, y) ν(y) dy, (4.15)
for all distributions ν ∈ Pac(Y).
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Remark 4.1 The quantity u[ν], which could be referred to as an ability to move or as a
mean velocity in social configuration space is constructed by averaging the individual social
velocities V (x, y) of all the individuals located at social configuration x having strategy y,
over the Nash equilibrium distribution νeq, ρ(x,t) .
Proof of Theorem 4.2. From (4.7), we have that Q(f ε) = O(ε) and owing to the
convergence assumptions made on f ε, we have Q(f) = 0. Thanks to Lemma 4.1, f is
of the form (4.11). Now, observe that 1 is a collisional invariant of Q, meaning that∫
y∈Y
Q(f)(y) dy = 0, for all functions f(y) (simply by Green’s formula and the boundary
conditions). Therefore, integrating (4.7) with respect to y leads to
∂tρ
ε +∇x · (ρεuε) = 0, (4.16)
with uε(x, t) = u[νεx,t](x) where u[ν](x) is given by (4.15) and ν
ε
x,t is related to f
ε by
the first eq. (4.6). Then, taking the limit ε → 0 in (4.16) and using that ρε → ρ and
νεx,t → νeq, ρ(x,t), we get that uε → u[νeq, ρ(x,t)](x) and that the limit of Eq. (4.16) is
precisely (4.13).
Remark 4.2 We note that Eq. (4.13) (complemented with an initial condition ρ0(x) and
possibly boundary conditions) does not necessarily lead to a closed system. We will provide
examples in the next section where additional equations may be required to provide a closed
problem. However, in many cases, the solution of the Nash equilibrium problem (3.11) is
not known explicitly. This suggests the development of coarse-graining strategies, based
on e.g. the Heterogeneous Multiscale Method [13] or kinetic upscaling [9].
5 Models of social herding behavior
5.1 General framework
Here, we specify the potential Φf (x, y) as given by the following kernel:
Φf (x, y) =
∫
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
k(x, y, x′, y′)f(x′, y′) dx′ dy′, (5.1)
where (x, y, x′, y′) ∈ (X×Y)2 7→ k(x, y, x′, y′) ∈ R is a given function. To be more specific,
we focus on a model of social herding behavior, where pairs of agents try to minimize the
angle between their respective social velocities. Namely, we set:
k(x, y, x′, y′) = −K(x, x′) V (x, y) · V (x′, y′), (5.2)
where V (x, y) is the velocity in social space specified earlier and the dot refers to inner
product in the vector space X . By trying to minimize the angle between their own velocity
and that of their neighbors, the agents adopt a mimetic behavior, and tend to move in
social space in the same direction as the others. We can write
Φf (x, y) = −V (x, y) · Wf (x), (5.3)
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with
Wf (x) =
∫
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
K(x, x′)V (x′, y′) f(x′, y′) dx′ dy′ ∈ X . (5.4)
We can view Wf as some average of V (x, y) over f .
Now, let us first focus on the homogeneous configuration case, letting K = 1. In this
case, f(y, t) satisfies (3.1) with Φf (y) given by:
Φf (y) = −V (y) · Wf , Wf =
∫
y′∈Y
V (y′) f(y′) dy′ (5.5)
By (3.11) the Nash equilibrium is now depending on a parameter W ∈ X . It is denoted
by MW and given by (3.5) with Φ(y) = −V (y) ·W , i.e.
MW (y) =
1
ZW
exp
(1
d
(V (y) ·W )) with ZW =
∫
y∈Y
exp
(1
d
(V (y) ·W )) dy. (5.6)
Now, eq. (3.11) which defines a Nash equilibrium is replaced by a ‘compatibility condition’
deduced from (5.4) and which expresses that
W =WMW ,
or equivalently
W
∫
y∈Y
exp
(1
d
(V (y) ·W )) dy =
∫
y∈Y
exp
(1
d
(V (y) ·W ))V (y) dy. (5.7)
The associated game is a potential game. Indeed, we introduce the potential energy
U(f) = −1
2
|Wf |2. (5.8)
According to definition (3.16), we have, for all test functions φ(y),
∫
y∈Y
δU(f)
δf
(y)φ(y) dy = −Wf ·
∫
y∈Y
δWf
δf
φ(y) dy
= −Wf ·
∫
y∈Y
V (y)φ(y) dy
=
∫
y∈Y
Φf (y)φ(y) dy, (5.9)
where, to pass from the first to the second line, we have used that, in the homogeneous
configuration case, Wf is linear with respect to f . So, we get:
δU(f)
δf
(y) = Φf (y), (5.10)
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which shows that the game with augmented cost function µf (y) given by (3.3) is a potentiel
game associated to potential U . Its variational structure is associated to the following
free energy functional (thanks to (3.17) (3.18) and (5.10)):
F(f) = S(f)− 1
2
|Wf |2. (5.11)
In economics, one may be interested in the ‘social cost’ [5, 6] defined by:
C(f) =
∫
y∈Y
µf (y) f(y) dy = S(f)−
∫
y∈Y
Φf (y) f(y) dy, (5.12)
where the second equality comes from (3.3), (3.17). Definition (5.12) expresses that
the total cost for the society is the sum of the individual costs µf (y) averaged over the
distribution of strategies f(y). Now, taking φ = f in (5.9) we have, for all f ∈ Pac(Y):
∫
y∈Y
Φf (y) f(y) dy =
∫
y∈Y
δU(f)
δf
(y) f(y) dy.
But, noting that U(f) is a quadratic function of f , we have the following identity, which
is valid for all degree 2 homogeneous functions:
∫
y∈Y
δU(f)
δf
(y) f(y) dy = 2U(f).
It follows that, for all f ∈ Pac(Y):∫
y∈Y
Φf (y) f(y) dy = −|Wf |2. (5.13)
Then, the social cost (5.12) has the expression
C(f) = S(f)− |Wf |2. (5.14)
Note, that the free energy (5.11) and social cost (5.14) differ by a factor 1/2 in front of
|Wf |2. Then, we have F(f) = S(f) + 12 |Wf |2. Therefore, a minimizer of the free energy
is not necessarily a minimizer of the social cost, which is called a ‘social optimum’. The
reason for this is that the agents take into account the cost of their own interaction but
do not take into account the cost of the interaction for the agents they are interacting
with. Hence, they are missing half of the total interaction energy. Consequently, the
difference F(f) − C(f) = 1
2
|Wf |2 is a kind of measure of social disorder. In general, a
Nash equilibrium gives rise to a minimizer of the free energy instead of the social cost.
The reason is that individual players make strategies without taking into account the cost
of the freely available social infrastructure. To correct this discrepancy, one has to make
players pay for the use of this infrastructure by e.g. assigning taxes. In the present cases,
taxes would lead to an augmented cost function equal to µf (y)− V (y) · Wf . An example
pertaining with city planning can be found in [6].
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5.2 Example: animal herding model
In this section, we consider a special case of the above one which describes the herding
behavior a group of animals or a human crowd. The social space X coincides with the
geographical space Rn (with n = 2 (for crowds) or n = 3 (for fish schools for instance)).
The decision variable y is the direction of the motion of the individuals and is such that
y ∈ Y = Sn−1, where Sn−1 is the unit sphere of Rn endowed with the Lebesgue measure dy
(normalized such that the total measure of Y is equal to 1). The function V (y) relating
the decision variable to the physical speed is independent of x and simply given by:
V (y) = y,
where the speed (supposed uniform and independent of position) is normalized to 1
through the non-dimensionalization procedure. We take the same kernel (5.2) as before,
which leads to the cost function
Φf (x, y) = −y · Wf (x), (5.15)
with
Wf (x) =
∫
(x′,y′)∈Rn×Sn−1
K(x, x′) y′ f(x′, y′) dx′ dy′. (5.16)
In the homogenous configuration case (where we set K = 1), the free energy is still
given by (5.11) where now Wf is given by
Wf =
∫
y′∈Sn−1
y′ f(y′) dy′.
Then, from (5.6), the Nash equilibrium is given by a so-called Von-Mises-Fischer (VMF)
distribution
MW (y) =
1
ZW
exp
(1
d
(y ·W )), ZW =
∫
y∈Sn−1
exp
(1
d
(y ·W )) dy, (5.17)
where W ∈ Rn is a solution of (5.7). In the present context, this equation is written:
W
∫
y∈Sn−1
exp
(1
d
(y ·W )) dy =
∫
y∈Sn−1
exp
(1
d
(y ·W )) y dy. (5.18)
By rotational symmetry and expressing the integrals in (5.18) in polar coordinates, we
can write
W = |W |Ω, (5.19)
where Ω ∈ Sn−1 is arbitrary. The quantity κ = |W |/d satisfies:
c(κ) = d κ, (5.20)
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with
c(κ) =
∫ pi
0
eκ cos θ cos θ sinn−2 θ dθ∫ pi
0
eκ cos θ sinn−2 θ dθ
, (5.21)
and cos θ = y · Ω. Then, the VMF distribution (5.17) is more conveniently written MκΩ
(where κ ∈ R+ is the concentration parameter and Ω is the mean direction) as:
MκΩ(y) =
1
Zκ
exp
(
κ(y · Ω)), (5.22)
with Zκ given by the denominator of (5.21). The quantity c(κ) is the order parameter. It
is an increasing function of κ which satisfies 0 ≤ c(κ) ≤ 1. When c(κ) ≈ 0, then MκΩ(y)
is nearly isotropic (i.e. MκΩ(y) ≈ 1). On the other-hand, when c(κ)→ 1, which happens
when κ→∞, then MκΩ(y)→ δΩ(y) (see details in [8, 14]).
Now, we look at the solutions of the compatibility condition (5.20). This analysis has
been performed in [8, 14]. We only summarize the final results in the following.
Theorem 5.1 [8, 14] (i) If c′(0) = 1
n
≤ d, then, the only solution of Eq. (5.20) is κ = 0
and the associated equilibrium (5.22) is the uniform distribution M0 = 1. It is a stable
equilibrium.
(ii) If c′(0) = 1
n
> d, then, there exist exactly two solutions of Eq. (5.20): κ = 0 and
another solution denoted by κd > 0. κd is a strictly decreasing function of d ∈ [0, 1n ] onto
(+∞, 0]. The associated equilibria (5.22) are the uniform distribution M0 = 1 associated
to κ = 0 and all VMF distributions MκdΩ where Ω takes any value on the sphere S
n−1.
The uniform equilibrium is now unstable and the VMF equilibria MκdΩ for all Ω ∈ Sn−1
are the ground states of the free energy and are stable.
We refer to [8, 14] for the precise mathematical statement of the stability result, as well
as for rate estimates of convergence to the equilibria in the homogeneous configuration
case.
Remark 5.1 If n = 1, then Sn−1 = {−1, 1} and c(κ) = tanh(κ). The compatibility
condition (5.20) is the same as the mean-field equation in the Ising spin model for ferro-
magnetism [17].
Now, we apply the coarse-graining procedure with Nash equilibrium closure developed
in section 4 to this special case. To implement this closure, we first need to verify condition
(4.5). For this purpose, we assume that
K(x, x′) = k¯
(∣∣ |x− x′|
ε
∣∣), (5.23)
with k¯(r): r ∈ [0,∞) → R+ a given kernel. The quantities associated to such kernel K
by (5.15) and (5.16) are denoted by Φεf and Wεf . For simplicity, we assume∫
x∈X
k¯
(∣∣x∣∣) dx = 1.
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Then, inserting (5.23) into (5.16) and expanding in powers of ε, we get, for f ∈ Pac(X×Y):
Wεf (x) = ρ(x)W˜νx +O(ε2), (5.24)
with for all ν ∈ Pac(Y),
W˜ν =
∫
y′∈Sn−1
y′ ν(y′) dy′. (5.25)
By inserting this expansion into (5.15), we get
Φεf (x, y) = Φρ, νx(y) +O(ε
2), (5.26)
where, for ρ ∈ R+ and ν ∈ Pac(Y), we set
Φρ, ν(y) = −ρ y · W˜ν . (5.27)
We note that, in order to recover the homogeneous configuration setting of the beginning
of this section, Wf must be replaced by ρW˜ν in (5.15). It follows that the compatibility
condition (5.20) becomes
c(κ) = κ
d
ρ
,
and that the Nash equilibrium solutions are now the VMF distributions Mκd/ρΩ, with
Ω ∈ Sn−1. The discussion of Theorem 5.1 is still valid provided that d is replaced by
d/ρ everywhere. Therefore, there are two regimes corresponding to items (i) and (ii) in
the statement of Theorem 5.1. We successively describe the models resulting from the
application of Theorem 4.2 for these two regimes.
(i) Large noise or small density case: d
ρ
≥ 1
n
. Then, the only Nash equilibrium being
the isotropic distribution M0 = 1, the macroscopic velocity u as given by (4.14),
(4.15) is
u = u[1] =
∫
y∈Sn−1
y dy = 0,
by antisymmetry. The macroscopic equation (4.13) reduces to
∂tρ = 0.
In order to get a meaningful macroscopic model, we must rescale time to diffu-
sive scales. In this case, a diffusion approximation procedure leads to a nonlinear
diffusion equation for ρ. Details can be found in [8].
(ii) Small noise or large density case: d
ρ
< 1
n
. Then, we use the ground-state Nash
equilibrium Mκd/ρΩ, where Ω ∈ Sn−1. In this case, f is given by (4.11), i.e.:
f(x, y, t) = ρ(x, t)Mκd/ρΩ(x,t)(y). (5.28)
By the computations above, the mean velocity u is given by
u(x, t) = c(κd/ρ)Ω(x, t) 6= 0.
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The Nash Equilibrium macroscopic closure equation (4.13) gives
∂tρ+∇x · (c(κd/ρ)ρΩ) = 0. (5.29)
We note that it does not provide an equation for Ω(x, t) yet and as such, would lead
to an ill-posed problem. However, by using the concept of Generalized Collision
Invariant (GCI) [12], it is possible to derive the equation for Ω. This equation
reads:
∂tΩ + b(ρ)(Ω · ∇x)Ω + Θ(ρ)PΩ⊥∇xρ = 0, (5.30)
where b(ρ) and Θ(ρ) are real-valued functions of ρ and PΩ⊥ = Id − Ω ⊗ Ω is the
orthogonal projection of X onto the hyperplane space (Span{Ω})⊥ orthogonal to
Ω. The functions b and Θ are not specified here. They are obtained through the
application of the GCI to (4.11). Details can be found in [8]. We note that because
of the presence of the projection PΩ⊥ the constraint |Ω| = 1 is propagated in time
as soon as it is verified at time t = 0. We note that the system is not in conservative
form but, in some conditions, it can be shown to be well-posed [10].
This example illustrates that the Nash Equilibrium closure can be effectively used to
derive macroscopic closures. However, the mere mass conservation equation (4.13) may
be not be enough to provide a well-posed closed system and that additional techniques
must be called for in order to find a closed system.
6 Conclusion and perspectives
In this paper we have provided a framework for the time evolution of a system of rational
players in a non-cooperative anonymous game with a continuum of players (or Mean-
Field Game) which collectively make their decision by choosing the best-reply strategy,
i.e. they move in the steepest descent direction of the individual cost functions. As-
suming that the individual actions are fast and localized in social configuration space,
we have derived a macroscopic dynamic which describes the large scale evolution of the
parameters of the local Nash equilibria. In forthcoming works, we plan to apply this
framework to various phenomena such as the evolution of the distribution of wealth in
the economic neighborhood, opinion formation, social dynamics and collective decision
making. The development of numerical methods based on the gradient flow structure
offers interesting perspective for the computation of the local Nash equilibria in the case
of potential games. Various elaborations of our framework can be envisionned, such as
including mixed strategies or a non-deterministic component of the cost function, like e.g.
in [21].
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